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Highlights 
 We examine whether personal connections affect sovereign credit ratings 
 We find that, ceteris paribus, debt issued by connected sovereigns receives a better rating 
 The average difference in rating is 0.58 and 0.94 points higher on a 58-point scale. 
 The better rating appears to be driven by more favorable treatment of the sovereign. 
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ABSTRACT 
In a large sample of sovereign debt issues, we show that a personal connection between senior 
executives in credit rating agencies and leading politicians in the sovereign results in an improved rating. 
A test on bond yields suggest that the personal connection reflects a favorable treatment of the issuer. 
JEL: D82, G24, L14  
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1. Introduction 
 
Studying the process of sovereign credit ratings is important because ratings have been shown 
to affect a country’s economic growth rate (Chen et al., 2016), its ability to raise capital and 
improve the flow of direct investment (Almeida et al., 2016; Cornagia et al., 2017), and to 
impose a ceiling on ratings of other asset classes in the country (Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; 
Almeida et al., 2016). Moreover, changes in one country’s sovereign rating can also impact on 
the rating of other countries, triggering instabilities and harming domestic investors in those 
countries (Augustin et al., 2018; Baum et al., 2016). Given these potentially important economic 
effects, it is not surprising that a lot of attention has been focused on the extent to which 
ratings are impartial. However, most of this attention has focused on the difficulties in 
managing potential conflicts of interest that arise from the “issuer-pays” business model that 
dominates the industry (e.g., Bolton et al., 2012; Mathis et al., 2009). In particular, the model 
has been criticized because it provides an incentive for CRAs to assign better ratings to bigger 
clients to win long-term business and because competition between CRAs reduces efficiency by 
facilitating ratings shopping in search of the most lenient rating provider. There has been less 
attention on how CRAs impartiality might be affected by personal connections between the 
agencies and the sovereign debt issuer, notwithstanding the growing literature on the 
importance of executive networks to business policies and decisions. In this literature, 
connections are typically established through one of two channels: a connection through a 
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common education experience (e.g., having attended the same school or university); and a 
connection through a shared professional experience (e.g., having served on the same 
executive board). These connections are viewed as either creating or destroying firm value. For 
example, Engelberg et al. (2012) establish that bank borrowers receive better terms when they 
have informal ties to lenders; Cohen et al. (2008) find that portfolio managers place larger bets 
on connected firms; and Cohen et al. (2010) report that sell-side analysts outperform on their 
stock recommendations when they have an educational link to executives in the company. A 
particularly relevant strand of the executive network literature focuses on the advantages to 
firms from political ties, including the likelihood of receiving state bail-outs (Faccio et al., 2005), 
being more profitable (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013), being more likely to be awarded state 
contracts (Schoenherr, 2018), increasing firm value (Duchin and Sosyura, 2013; Gropper et al., 
2013, 2015); providing better access to external funding (Engelberg et al., 2012; Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005); getting regulatory and/or taxation relief (Correia, 2014); and through the better 
transmission of information, ideas and knowledge (El-Khatib et al., 2015). In contrast, Bertrand 
et al. (2018) report that firms in which the CEO had strong political connections are generally 
less profitable; Fracassi and Tate (2012) demonstrate that social ties between CEOs and the 
directors weaken board monitoring and destroy corporate value; Fracassi (2016) finds that 
firms where the directors are more connected with each other display similar traits in their 
investment strategies; and Hwang and Kim (2009) conclude that directors who are personally 
connected to the CEO receive higher remuneration and exhibit both lower pay-performance 
and turnover-performance sensitivity. Research specifically on the role of networks in affecting 
credit ratings appears to be limited to Khatami et al. (2016) who report that personal 
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connections between private debt issuers and rating agencies result in a better rating than 
would otherwise be the case, which they attribute to the connection resulting in a lower degree 
of asymmetric information as the connection reveals “soft” information about the debt issuer; 
in the absence of the additional information, the CRA would likely have given a more 
conservative rating to protect its reputation.  
 
In this paper, we examine whether sovereign ratings are affected by the presence of a personal 
connection between the prime minister in the sovereign and senior executives in the CRA. We 
focus on the prime minister in the sovereign on the basis that this link is likely to reflect the 
most influential personal connection for the CRA. We establish the connection through the 
common educational experience channel and examine its impact on the credit rating awarded 
by the CRA. We hypothesize that such an effect can be explained by two paradigms. Firstly, 
personal connections may act as an information channel. The literature has established that 
when CRAs are not able to acquire enough information about the issuer they are more likely to 
issue more conservative ratings (Bannier et al., 2010). However, a connected issuer might be 
less opaque to the CRA and the need for conservatism when issuing its rating could be 
diminished—i.e., the connection acts as a channel of information that enables a CRA to better 
understand the financial situation of the sovereign and issue a more optimistic rating without 
compromising its reputation. Secondly, the rivalry between CRAs in sustaining their market 
share might put pressure on them to act in the best interest of the issuers. For example, Bolton 
et al., (2012) show that competition between CRAs results in issuers shopping for their ratings, 
and Jiang et al. (2012) show that conflict of interest due to the issuer-pay model results in 
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higher ratings. Thus, senior executives in CRAs personally connected to politicians might show 
favoritism by pushing for a more optimistic sovereign rating than would be the case without the 
connection. On the basis of the above, we hypothesise that: 
 
Ho: Connected sovereigns receive a higher credit rating than unconnected sovereigns, other 
things being equal. 
 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study of the impact of personal connections on sovereign 
credit ratings. In addition to our developing this particular field of the sovereign rating 
literature, we contribute to the wider literature on the determinants of credit ratings that has 
been shown to include, for example, the length of the relationship between the debt issuer and 
the rating agency (M hlmann, 2011), reputational concerns (Mathis et al., 200 ), the si e of the 
rating fee (Butler and Cornaggia, 2012), and whether or not the rating was solicited by the debt 
issuer (Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy, 2013). 
 
2. Model and data 
 
We examine the effect of personal connections on sovereign credit ratings by estimating the 
following panel regression: 
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(1) 
 
where      is the observed rating category assigned to the sovereign and is based on monthly 
long-term foreign-currency ratings by Standard &Poor’s between January 2000 and November 
2017, and where ratings are defined using a scale ranging between 1-58 that includes watch 
and outlook status (see Appendix 1).    and    are country and year fixed effects, respectively. 
To establish the presence of a personal connection between senior executives in the CRA and 
prime minister in the sovereign, we follow Cohen et al. (2008) and focus on shared educational 
backgrounds, on the basis that these often reflect aligned interests with educational institutions 
being the largest beneficiary of an individual’s charitable donations, and that school 
relationships are often more homophilous than those formed in other settings. Unlike other 
measures such as lobbying expenditures, educational backgrounds allow us to detect direct 
connections between senior executives and politicians that would be more difficult to infer 
from contributions to political campaigns (Jagolinzer et al., 2017). Accordingly, our personal 
connections variable,         is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0 otherwise) if 
there is a shared education experience between at least one senior CRA executive and the 
prime minister in the sovereign. We rely on CRA annual reports and national government 
websites to identify the names of CRA executives and prime ministers in office and gather 
information on their respective education backgrounds from BoardEx. We control for possible 
upward bias in the credit rating that might result from the rating having been solicited by the 
debt issuer by including the variable         , which is a 0,1 dummy variable with 1 indicating 
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that the rating was not solicited (0 otherwise), and for possible bias in the credit rating that 
might result from a lengthy relationship between the debt issuer and the rating agency 
(Mählmann 2011) by including the variable         , which is the number of years since the 
sovereign was first rated by the CRA.  
 
We also include several variables likely to be relevant for the effectiveness of the personal 
connection as an information channel or as a source of pressure on the CRA to act in the best 
interest of the sovereign. First, we include tenure of the prime minister,       , as a proxy for 
the power of the prime minister on the assumption that longer-serving prime ministers are 
more powerful. Second, we include a proxy for the length of the personal connection, which is 
the prime minister’s age,       . As our personal connection variable is a dummy that may 
indicate a shared connection with more than one senior CRA executive, the calculation of the 
length of the relationship is not straight forward and we simply assume that the relationship 
will have been longer the older is the prime minister. Third, we include the frequency of 
parliamentary elections,       , the outcomes of which can be expected to impact on the 
durability of the personal connection. Fourth, we control for the possible impact on the 
strength of the personal connection of the 2007-08 financial crisis, for example, in case the 
connection was weakened as a result of more effective regulation in the post crisis period. The 
vector     includes the sovereign risk rating in the previous period and economic variables (GDP 
growth, inflation, external current account balance, and investment) that have been shown in 
the literature to impact on sovereign ratings (e.g., Cantor and Packer, 1996).  
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The panel comprises 441 rating actions for 38 sovereigns from January 2000 to November 2017. 
Summary statistics and the countries included in the sample are shown in Table 1 and variable 
definitions and data sources are presented in Appendix Table 2. Two potential problems in 
estimating Equation (1) are reverse causality, where the rating of a debt issue may lead to the 
creation of a personal connection, and self-selection bias as ratings can be solicited by the 
issuing company. The first problem appears to be unlikely given that the connections were 
formed long before the issue of the sovereign being rated. The second problem we deal with by 
including the solicitation status of the rating in the estimates.  
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
The estimated coefficients from fixed effects panel estimates are reported in Table 2 where the 
control variables are entered sequentially. The results indicate strongly that personal 
connections play an important role in determining sovereign credit ratings, with the result 
robust to a large number of controls. The coefficients on the personal connection variable are 
always positive and statistically significant and suggest that a prior educational connection 
between CRA executives and prime ministers increases the sovereign credit rating by between 
0.58 and 0.94 points on a 58-point scale compared to a non-connected sovereign. In addition, 
sovereign credit ratings appear to be impacted positively by the length of the business 
relationship, the power of the prime minister, and the length of the personal relationship, 
whereas ratings that are unsolicited by the sovereign tend to be lower than those that are 
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solicited. Of the other control variables, higher sovereign ratings are associated with the prior 
rating, low inflation, strong current account positions, and higher levels of investment. 
Parliamentary elections and the financial crisis appear to have had no statistically significant 
impact on ratings. 
 
As discussed above, a personal connection being associated with a higher credit rating is 
subject to at least two interpretations. The more generous interpretation is that a personal 
connection is a channel for reducing information asymmetries between the CRA and the 
sovereign, which reduces the incentive for the CRA to issue a more conservative rating in the 
absence of the information. The less generous interpretation is that the connection results in a 
higher rating because of “favouritism.” To try to distinguish between these possibilities, we 
adopt a test suggested by Khatami et al. (2016) in the context of private debt ratings. In an 
efficient financial market, if connected issuers receive artificially higher ratings due to more 
favorable treatment, we would expect sovereign bond yields to adjust upwards over time as 
more information about the sovereign eventually becomes available. On the other hand, if 
personal connections act as an information channel, the later increase in bond yields should not 
occur. In Table 3 we show the differences between mean bond yields of a sample of 15 
sovereign debt issuers in the periods before and after the personal connection was established 
(through a common education) with the rating agency. Specifically, Panel A of the table 
compares the mean bond yields of sovereigns at the time the connection was established to the 
mean bond yield in the period before the connection. A simple univariate t-test shows that 
there was no significant difference between the two means. In Panel B, we compare the mean 
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bond yield 12 months after the connection was established with the mean yield for the period 
before the connection. In this case, the mean bond yield after the connection was established is 
higher, and the difference in means is statistically significant. This is consistent with the rating 
assigned to the connected sovereign having been driven by a favourable treatment of the 
issuer.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In a panel of credit ratings of 38 sovereigns, we find that a prior personal connection between  
senior executives in the rating agency and the prime minister in the sovereign is associated with 
a more positive credit rating of the sovereign. This result is robust to the inclusion of several 
control variables likely to impact of the personal connection as either an informal information 
channel to the CRA or as source of pressure on the CRA, as well as to the inclusion of economic 
variables that the previous literature has found to be important in the determination of 
sovereign credit ratings. Developments in sovereign bond yields following the establishment of 
the personal connection suggest that the higher credit rating of connected sovereigns reflects a 
more favorable treatment of the issuer by the CRA. We view our results as an important first 
step in the development of a literature on the impact of personal connections on sovereign 
credit rating, as well as a contribution to the wider literature on the determinants of credit 
ratings. In addition, our results have an important implication for financial regulation in that 
they need to recognize that personal connections with CRAs give sovereigns a clear advantage 
in the rating process and to ensure that this advantage reflects the information channel rather 
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than (as our results—albeit weakly suggest) “favoritism” exhibited by the CRA. In future 
research, we propose to examine the robustness of our results to a larger sample of ratings and 
agencies, and to a broader array of personal connections, including other thank linkages 
through a common education. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics and country sample 
A. Summary statistics       
 Observations Mean Median Standard deviations Maximum Minimum 
Credit rating  8170 41.67 43.00 14.28 58.00 1.000 
Personal connection 8170 0.100 0.000 0.300 1.000 0.000 
Business ties 8170 26.62 25.89 8.430 42.97 8.990 
Unsolicited rating 8170 0.090 0.000 0.290 1.000 0.000 
Inflation 8170 3.760 2.380 4.970 51.47 -1.330 
Current account to GDP 8170 -0.730 -0.850 7.070 28.84 -23.31 
Real GDP growth 8170 0.510 0.580 1.230 3.690 -5.490 
Total investment to GDP 8170 22.24 22.59 5.000 57.99 9.830 
Politician tenure (months) 8170 47.88 35.00 44.16 212.0 1.000 
Length of connection 
(months) 
8170 424.3 411.4 102.6 752.2 202.8 
Elections 8170 0.020 0.000 0.140 1.00 0.000 
B. Countries in the sample  
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. 
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Table 2 
Panel least squares estimates of the determinants of sovereign credit ratings—dependent 
variable:  sovereign credit rating 
 1 2 3 4 
Personal connection  0.857*** 
(0.250) 
 0.583*** 
(0.224) 
 0.942*** 
(0.266) 
 0.941*** 
(0.266) 
Business ties  1.147*** 
(0.015) 
 1.068*** 
(0.015) 
 1.153*** 
(0.035) 
 1.155*** 
(0.035) 
Unsoliciated rating -0.479* 
(0.266) 
-0.686*** 
(0.243) 
-0.511* 
(0.289) 
-0.525* 
(0.289) 
Inflation  -0.463*** 
(0.022) 
-0.264*** 
(0.035) 
-0.262*** 
(0.035) 
Current account   0.094*** 
(0.016) 
 0.098*** 
(0.017) 
 0.096*** 
(0.017) 
GDP growth   0.104 
(0.070) 
 0.521*** 
(0.079) 
 0.546*** 
(0.081) 
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Investment   0.639*** 
(0.020) 
 0.277*** 
(0.022) 
 0.275*** 
(0.022) 
Prime minister tenure    0.158** 
(0.080) 
 0.153* 
(0.081) 
Prime minister age    0.009*** 
(0.001) 
 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
Elections   -0.375 
(0.402) 
-0.367 
(0.402) 
Prior rating    0.745*** 
(0.103) 
 0.738*** 
(0.104) 
Financial crisis     -0.344 
(0.247) 
Observations 8134 8134 7986 7986 
R
2
 0.861 0.889 0.948 0.998 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the sovereign credit rating ranges on a scale between 1 to 
58.  Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Univariate 10-years sovereign bond yield analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Bond yield mean Difference in mean (basis points) Difference p-value 
Average bond yield at time of the connection 
  Connected period 4.198   
  Non-connected period 4.012 -0.186 -1.264 
Average bond yield one year after the connection 
  Connected period 4.405   
  Non-connected period 3.876 -0.529*** -3.445 
Notes. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 1 
Transposition of S&P credit rating letter-grades into numerical scores 
S&P rating Credit rating scale  
AAA 58 
AA+ 55 
AA 52 
AA- 49 
A+ 46 
A 43 
A- 40 
BBB+ 37 
BBB 34 
BBB- 31 
BB+ 28 
BB 25 
BB- 22 
B+ 19 
B 16 
B- 13 
CCC+ 10 
CCC 7 
CCC- 4 
C 1 
SD 1 
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Appendix 2.  
Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Data source 
Sovereign credit 
rating 
Transposition of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) sovereign credit rating letter-grades into numerical 
scores (see Appendix 1) 
S&P credit reports 
PM connection A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0 otherwise) if there is a shared education 
experience between at least one senior CRA executive and the Prime Minister of the sovereign 
BoardEx 
Business ties The number of years since the sovereign was first rated by S&P S&P annual reports 
Unsolicited rating A 0,1 dummy variable whereby 1 indicates that the rating was not solicited by the sovereign (0 
otherwise). 
S&P annual reports 
Inflation Annual percent change in the consumer price index of the sovereign WDI  
Current account External current account balance of the sovereign in percent of GDP WDI 
GDP growth Annual percent change in the real GDP of the sovereign WDI 
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Total investment  Total fixed investment (public and private) if the sovereign in percent of GDP WDI 
Politician tenure Number of months that the politician has been in office ParlGov 
Length of S&P-
political 
connection 
Number of months since the connection between the S&P senior executive and the politician was 
established 
BoardEx and authors’ calculation 
Elections Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the month and year of the parliamentary elections for 
each country in the sample and 0 otherwise 
EED 
Financial crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during 2007-09 and 2010-12 and 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 
Notes: WDI is the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database; ParlGov is the University of Bremen’s Parliament and Government Composition 
database; EED is the European Election database. 
 
